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Market and Democracy:
Friends or Foes?
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Budapest, and Visiting Professor at the Frankfurt Institute for Transformation
Studies of the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder).
Market and Democracy: Friends or Foes?1
The postmodern realities of the turn of the century make it next to impossible to
formulate unambiguous causal relationships between individual phenomena. The
more complex these are, the harder it is to prove the existence of causality as well
as the working of the algorithms and mechanisms through which the cause-
consequence relationship functions. In our case neither democracy nor the market
can be taken as clearly defined concepts or categories, elementary facts that could
easily fit into one of our econometric models. Thus it is unsurprising if their
interrelationship counts among the evergreens of economic theory and political
science alike, especially in the development context. The situation is further
complicated by the complexities of postsocialist transformation, which presents a
series of novel or partly novel theoretical and policy issues2 that add to the
challenge of Central- and East European developmental catchup and
modernisation. It is in this peculiar context that the interrelationships between
democracy and the market, both interpreted according to the classical liberal
tradition3 is going to be scrutinized, with keeping an eye on the Russian/Baltic
experiences in the 90s. As proper elaboration of the subject would require a
monograph, I shall restrain the discussion to seven thesis.
1.  In the very first stage of systemic change, stabilization democracy and the
market are clearly foes4. Stabilization, unlike institution building and
developmental policies, constitutes a basically technical task that any
government had to put in operation, irrespective of its broader deliberations.
Why the currency reform of Ludwig Erhard in 1948 paved the way to the social
market economy in Germany, the Hungarian stabilization of 1946, though
arrested the highest inflation in economic history, meanwhile its technique
paved the way to a gradual introduction of an autarkic command economy years
before Communist takeover in 1949 (Ausch 1958). It has been a general
experience in transforming countries that legislation, political parties, the press
and local municipalities in their overwhelming majority rejected and resented
the measures aimed at stabilization. In case of Russia attempts by the Gaidar
government to stabilize in 1992 started to be watered down and later openly
sabotaged by legislation and also by the central bank. The 1993 and 1995
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elections produced legislative majorities clearly hostile to plans of disinflation.
When from mid-1996 stabilization still materialized, it happened owing to the
newly won legitimation of President Yeltsin as well as his government`s ability
and willingness to circumvent hostile legislation and disregard public opinion
on economic issues. Forms of civil society, from local municipalities to
members of the Academy of Sciences have been going out of their ways to turn
this tendency around in 1991-97. Opinion polls show a steady 30-35 per cent of
voters clearly favouring the free market economy as well as parties and
formations supporting these ideas. Only countries with next to incontestable
governmental authority succeeded in disinflation, like Poland in 1989-91,
Croatia, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and finally Russia. True, the
causual relationship is not reversible: a strong authoritian government may not
be a sufficient condition for sustaining disinflation, as Kazakhstan and other
Central Asian countries would testify. Whenever the government can be
leveraged by competing social groups or by public opinion, moderate levels of
inflation sustain, as in Poland since 1992, in Hungary, or in a different degree in
Serbia-Montenegro, Turkey or Brazil.
2. Once inflation stabilization is mastered, transformation is likely to focus on the
institutionalization of interests, on creating procedures and controls of
decisionmaking, both in the economic and the political fields. Building up
previously non-existant institutions, from constitutional courts to private
pension funds comes to the fore. At this stage of development democracy and
the market become friends (once stabilization has laid the groundwork). In
setting new, lasting and workable arrangements representation and also
articulation of conflicting interests is needed. The less the preoccupation of
parties with attaining immediate gains, in other words, the smaller the influence
of redistributory conditions is, the higher the functionality of the emerging
arrangements. In concrete terms only in the latter case is it resaonable to expect
that election cycles do not generate regular economic and legislative cycles,
which, of course, destabilize democracy and its institutions. In sum, the more
pure idealistic democratic considerations dominate in the elaboration of new
rules against bread and butter issues, and corporatist considerations, the more
stable institutional arrangements may emerge. The wider is the practice of
buying out opponents, the higher is the probability of ending up with a
monopolistic rent-seeking society with low equilibrium, low efficiency and
high polarization of wealth and income, especially if the state remains weak
(Leipold 1992). The above described development is clearly visible in the
Russian case in the 1993-96 period.
In the process of institutionalization it is of paramount importance that the
frame and rules in which the fight among competing claims can be waged
emerged in a transparent and calculable manner. Institutions in the economy
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abound, with the emergence of market infrastructure in such areas as trade in
agricultural commodities, equity markets, commercial banking, venture capital
funds, collateral financing and the like. The less public concerns are voiced and
can be articulated at the time of setting up the regulatory frame for those, the
higher is the probability of malfunctions and also of plain crime, as the collapse
of the Baltic Bank in Latvia or the high criminalization of the Russian banking
indicates.
In the political arena market relations require and promote the emergence of
modern, cross-class parties in the place of old-fashioned ideological and/or
regional or social group-representations. This is all the more important if the
left-right-left-right moves of the political shuttle is considered part and parcel of
normalcy, that does not necessarily lead to erratic zig-zag in the economic
course. From this angle Polish, Slovene, Estonian, Hungarian and Russian
developments look reassuring. As parties cannot be classified into those
representing the winners versus those of the losers, democracy may stabilize
even if the most colorful and intellectually stimulating figures of the early
stages had to give way to more professional political administrators and
workhorses. As Bronislaw Geremek (1996) put it aptly, democracy equals to
the rule of the Grey, as procedures matter more than personalities - and this
makes the liberal order safe and calculable for the individual.
3. If the market economy is seen as a spontaneous order (Hayek 1989) this means
our considering it to be a self-learning system, setting the objectives for itself
(rather than taking it extraneously from its environment in an unspecified
fashion, as in neoclassical models). This means that in purely economic terms
there is nobody among the outside agents (including polity) who could or
should take over the jobs of generating objectives as well as the competing
strategies. The more indeterminative "final" targets are, the more diverse the
"trajectories" leading to their attainment, the more indispensable democracy is.
And not only as an ingredient or as a customary fellow traveler to sound
economic policies, but a fundamental constituent in the workings of the system
as such. If trial and error is the modus operandi of the market order, pluralist
democracy is the only appropriate frame in which this can survive, correct its
errors while avoiding disintegration. This means that democratic controls are
indispensable for full-blood market institutions to work.
Rule of law is taken as given by all economic theories. Advanced market
institutions from banking to stabilized agricultural marketing orders all require
and presuppose the rule of law. Should this maximum not be observed,
transplantation of arrangements and techniques well proven in the OECD area,
may produce perverse results or undesirable side-effects. Discretionary decision
making has always been, by necessity, a hotbed for inefficiency, corruption,
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favouratism and generation of situation rents. The weaker the state, the higher
is the probability of these malfunctions. The CIS-countries have a particularly
notorious historical heritage of rule by decree, a practice that has not been
discontitued with the abolition of Communist one party rule. Much of the
pathologies of privatization and bank behaviour, richly analyzed in the Russian
and international daily press derive from the underdeveloped state of the rule of
law, where corruption and crime pays better than observing the regulations5.
The role of democracy and the related transparency requirement manifest
themselves particularly strongly in the fiscal area. Here both the revenue and
the expenditure sides, as well as the relationships among the various
subsystems of general government expenditure, and not least, their relationships
to the central bank require democratic controls. On the hand, no professionally
sound policies are even technically conceivable without clear delineations and
transparency of operations, regularly scrutinized by an outside watchdog (the
supreme auditing commission) under the jurisdiction of the legislative. The
latter, in turn, can be little more than a circus provided the relevant pieces of
information on the above transactions, their breakdown and outcome is not
regularly provided and disclosed in external audited reports, based on
international accounting standards (GFS of IMF). The above listed
requirements are also easier said than done. In the CIS countries, but also in
some other transforming countries these single rules of thumb are not (fully)
observed. As a consequence public debates are often economically irrelevant
(due to their subjects, targets as information base) or conversely, reforms have
side effects far exceeding the intentional effects. The rather spontaneous
emergence of fiscal federalism in the Russian Federation may be a good
example of this. On the other hand the public resistance to some of the more
radical fiscal reform measures in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and also
Romania have to do with the lack of transparency and the resultant public
misperceptions pertaining to the fundamental qualities of the pre-reform versus
post-reform systems. The lower is the transparency thus also the democratic
accountability of the public finance sector, the higher is the probability for
lobbyist, rent-seeking and arbitrary decisions to pay off, and thus proliferate.
Democracy and the rule of law play indispensable roles in supporting
entrepreneurial initiative as the major source of innovation and structural
change. New start-ups and reorganizations make the way for competing
strategies and the selection and clearing process ensuring the efficiency of the
market. The less the government is concerned with ensuring the contestability
of market, the greater are the dangers inherent in monopolistic practices, that
pose a threat to freedom and efficiency alike. The better the competitive
quantities of the market are preserved, the higher the efficiency and also the
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social gains are likely to be, including the creation of middle class (Fehl/ v.
Delhaes eds. 1997).
A middle class in transforming societies may well be quite dissimilar to its
look-alike in Northern or Western Europe. Still, the widespread procedure of
self-sustaining and self-employing activities already vouch warranty against
massive support to extremist movements. The rise and fall of V.V. Zhirinovsky
and the ongoing marginalization of extremist forces all across the region is a
direct indication of deep social changes. This is yet another way how economic,
social and political changes emerge in a mutually supportive/synergetic fashion.
4. Local power is certainly an area where the interaction between democracy and
the market is less than trivial. This issue is particularly relevant to large
countries, like Russia. But also in Central Europe, following centuries-old
traditions reinforced by the Scandinavian model, that served as a point of
reference in 1989/90, municipalities have been granted far-reaching powers in
terms of wealth, taxation and financing institutions (like hospitals, schools,
public transportation and infrastructure maintenance).
Local power in transformation countries has had a bad name as a "conservative"
(i.e. backward looking, status-quo oriented) force, and mostly rightly so.
Enlightenment tended to be generated by and devoluted from the power centre.
Under this angle the partly intentional, but largely spontaneous devolution of
authority that has been particularly manifest in Russia is mostly seen as a
setback for democracy. As demonstrated also by the 1996/97 elections to the
post of provincial governors various non-reformist candidates tended to win
with convincing majorities. Also in economic terms, the booming Moscow is in
sharp contrast to most provincial centres, where new start-ups, foreign
investments and the related networks, financial services and often elementary
services and infrastructure is non-available. Devolution of taxation often
implies not less, but more burden, more arbitrariness and less forthcoming
attitude on the side of authorities. It is hardly by chance that the Council of
Federation (the upper house) already twice rejected the tax code, which would
streamline, enumerate and specify the sorts and rates of all taxes and public
dues to be levied in the Russian federation.
The set of regional financial equalization and transfer schemes -
Finanzausgleich - are particularly poorly developed. This might be a problem as
developmental differences among various subjects of the Russian Federation
were in the range of 1:13 (Ivanov 1997) which is longer than between Albania
and Holland (the latter being roughly 1:10 at PPP), and as the source notes has
disruptive effects. In fact, white central tax burden in 1996 was about 9 per cent
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of GDP, in the same year the consolidated tax burden was 37 per cent, which
leaves very little room for centralized regional redistribution. Meanwhile most
local authorities tended to adopt a more restrictive, rather than a more liberal,
approach to entrepreneurship than Moscow powers. This, of course, slows
down supply response and enhances tensions.
There are, however, favourable elements in the devolution of authority from the
point of democratization. Local power emerged in response to local crisis
situations, i.e. the administrations had to act on their own, not waiting for
central directions. This is a step towards local self-management - a goal that
was promulgated by an 1995 law, but has a long way to go. Local management
shortens the information chain, thus decreases losses and enhances efficiency of
crisis management. Also control costs can be saved and the principal-agent
problem is less acute than was the case in the traditional Soviet single factory
model. In perspective local taxation may become more legitimate if people
have better insights and leverage over the ways money is being spent. This is
currently, as yet a potential, and a largely unused one. The interconnecition
between the public goods (provided or not provided locally) and public dues
(collected or uncollected) will become more transparent for all agents. This, in
time will improve tax consciousness and tax-paying morale. Current
governmental efforts to free corporations from social tasks may also enhance
responsabilities of the local governments and press them to (re)act. In a way,
former lower levels of a central administration cannot escape the
responsibilities (as well as the rights) stemming from the delegation of property
and authority to them. While they are mostly poorly prepared to perform new
tasks, multiparty elections and local civil society (including entreprenurial
interest) will surely push them towards improvement. Last but not least, US and
Chinese experience indicates, that decentralized large countries tend to (re)act
in a less militant and imperial fashion towards the outside world, than highly
centralized states do. This feature was clearly visible with the newly emergent
post-Soviet states from Sakha (Yakutia) to Tatarstan. By contrast, in areas
where regional self-management was denied or made practically impossible, as
in Chechnia or in Abkhazia, disruptive conflicts multiply.
5. Privatization is one of the core activities of systemic change. In this context the
peculiarity of this operation rests with its unprecedented size and scope.
Whereas in Western countries 5-10 per cent of national assets were passed over
private hands, postsocialist countries faced a much larger task. In Hungary, e.g.
in 1989 only 15 per cent of assets were private, while by end 1996 it grew to 75
per cent. In western economies available institutions, rules and
macrodistribution of wealth hardly change by privatizations. Therefore winners
are numerous (receipients of improved services), while losers are small in
numbers (laid off employees). An Eastern privatization is just the opposite to
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all these. Even in technical terms whereas in the West change of ownership is a
way to find new management, in the East (de facto contrary to government-
sponsored schemes) normally, as a rule, managers pick new owners. In sum,
while quick and sound privatization has been a must, the social implication was
inevitably controversial, distributionally non-neutral and losers were in large
numbers. There are several ways how - the often missing - democratic controls
may, and indeed should, remedy these ills.
Parliamentary democracy has the right and the possibility to introduce and
enforce those controls, regulations and taxation that are necessary both for the
equity and efficiency considerations and - in the end of the day - to ensure
social acceptance as well the correction of market failures that burden this
process. Again, technical/economic and broader political considerations
overlap.
As far as controls are concerned, a public information act, prescribing
disclosure commitments as well as the obligatory auditing of corporate balance
sheets may be the best way to remedy most of the pathologies of the initial
period. Restering of share ownership as well as transfers, keeping up to date
registers of asset ownership, licensing financial intermediaries and checking
their professional and moral credentials (including the blacklisting of managers
having been involved in major failures and frauds) sound though trivial, but
have a long way to go in most transforming countries. The same applies to
international accounting standards that may bring qualitatively different results
than soft and lax local traditions and practices. Enforcing the above listed
controls would produce sounder management (i.e. more efficiency) while
making the current early capitalist business sounder and also more transparent -
for stock owners and the public alike. Under these circumstances reasonable tax
rates could be set and collection of these dues were easier to administer, since
costs of evasion would approach costs of orderly payment.
One of the obvious market failures has been the widespread practice of insider
trading and the resultant general insider dominance in ownership structure and
also monopolization. In some cases domestic public monopolies were turned
into foreign - public or semipublic - monopolies during the privatization
operation. Asset stripping could not, in many cases, be prevented even if it went
at the cost of maximising corporate wealth (Bim 1996). Enforcing bankruptcy
legislation is also a public task: lacking it the market will not clear and such
irregularities, as retaining employees but not paying them for months, may
survive. Also antitrust and environmental concerns call for regulation. In a way,
much of what the public ascribes to private capitalism is a clear reflection of
regulatory failure, which in some cases can go as far as a complete lack of any
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regulation (as was the case with the Czech, Russian and Baltic equity markets
in the initial period). This hurts efficiency and equity considerations alike.
The reform program of the Russian government adopted in May 1997 addresses
some of the neuralgic points. The new emphasis on deconcentration, which
seem to have hit the previously almighty Gazprom (Financial Times 17/18 May
1997), the first results on severing tax collection, as well as the severing of
prudential and capital adequacy requirements have already accelerated
concentration of banks (as a special way of crisis management), which all point
to the right direction. This is reassuring even if empirical observations always
highlight how long ways implementing reform ideas have yet to go - at times,
against local power, at times against new private owners.
6.  When it comes to the reform of the welfare state, democracy and the market
seem to be obvious foes. Existing/inherited arrangements reflect a previous
social contract, to which everybody used to be a signatory one way or another.
Thus touching this issue by definition antagonises not only vested interests, but
also the un(der)informed majority of laymen who feel threatened in their
accustomed ways of life. Massive protests against minor cuts were the typical
reaction all across Europe. Generalizing Hungarian experience the Harvard
professor János Kornai (1995/96) has raised the question of limits to consensual
decision making in this important area. But as Premier Juppé and Chancellor
Kohl also had to experience, this problem is not restricted to transforming
economies only.
It seems certain, that similarly to tax legislation, the bits and pieces of welfare
reform cannot be put to referendum. However, democracy used to be called rule
by persuasion by the 18th century whigs, which is precisely the only way-out
from a potentially selfdamaging deadlock. People in transforming countries
have shown a remarkable endurance of hardship, meanwhile not adopting those
voting patterns as some political science theories, modeling them as economic
animals, would have suggested. The Russian presidential elections as well as
the Romanian parliamentary and presidential elections in 1996/97 were clear
testimonies in this respect. Thus the way its welfare reform is bound to differ in
genre, orchestration and implementation from stabilization: instead of a surgery
homeopatic therapy is needed, with a very high input from psychology and
other forms of non-financial motivation. Welfare reform will be protected and
will succeed only if sound economics (taking stock of the international
competition of localities) is combined with building up reform constituencies6
add a policy aimed at orchestrating widening support for these policies via open
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public exchanges of views in the phase of elaborating reform concept and their
implementation technologies and sequences.
Therefore it is probably reasonable to describe the connection between market
reforms and democracy in this area as a delicate balance. French, Belgian,
Italian and German experience point toward the dangers inherited in self-
reproduction of out of date arrangements, that may lead to ossification, delays
in and blockages of reforms, and finally a loss of competitive position, welfare
and freedoms. On the other hand, lack of societal control and democratic
participation may also be dangerous, as Russian and Ukrainian developments
indicate. It spontaneous devolution, erosion and local self-defence dominate all
central deliberations, the underprovision of public goods, services and functions
will be chronic that, in turn, may reproduce the disruptive chains of prereform
Latin American capitalism well known from Peru and Brazil. In the European
context this may be destabilizing, especially for democratic arrangements but
also in environmental, military and social terms, including health indicators. As
a recent cross-country analysis of developing country and transformation
experience (Buiter/ Lago/ Stern 1996) convincingly proves, successful market
reforms require strong rather than idle governments, both in technical terms
(institution building and regulation) and also as suppliers of services and
opportunities, that make market outcomes socially acceptable. But in the long
run, i.e. periods commensurate to the time required for rearranging the welfare
state, only democratically legitimated, participating terms of governance are
sustainable in the highly urbanized post-industrial societies across the globe.
This applies a Fortiori in the present conditions of internationalization and of
global informational society.
7.  While the debate over the interrelationships between market and democracy
would be hard to conclude, our previous reflections may be summarized as
follows. Unlike in the 50s and 60s, the turn of the millenium is not forthcoming
for ideas of developmental dictatorship. Globalization of financial markets, of
information technologies7, of the flow of commodities, knowledge and people
will though feel short of homogenizing mankind, however already palpably
narrowed the scope for fundamentally dissimilar, non-complying and seclusive
economic, social and cultural options alike. While until the 70s democracy
tended to be seen as the privilege of advanced North and West European
nations, by now several examples support the universal validity of these
approaches. Following decades of centralized catch-up strategies such diverse
countries as Spain, Korea, Chile and Taiwan all had to democratize. Mature
economics and mature societies do require democratic pluralist forms of
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governance, irrespective of their cultural and historical heritage or geographical
location.
These historical developments retroactively supply evidence to the theory of
Walter Eucken (1952/1990) having established a structural interdependence
between the political and the economic order. In the long run, only market
systems are compatible with democracy, and only democratic governance is
compatible with the market order. Interestingly, the areas that do not lend
themselves to market reforms in advanced countries are the ones where
practically no feedback and control mechanism constraints the activities of
those operating the respective systems. From our perspective it is extremely
important that Russia of the late 90s is quite unlike Russia of the 30s: it is not
an agrarian society any longer, but a country where the share of services by
1995 exceeded the 50 per cent benchmark in GDP. References to the Russian
soul or to history therefore are hardly overwhelming when the prospects of
democracy are at issue. Fifty-five per cent of Russia`s population live in big
cities, and their voting patterns already reflect this, explaining the failure of the
backward-looking coalition of inflation at the decisive point: in presidential
elections. Fundamentals of economic advancement, such as innovation, new
startups, the growing role of interfirm networks, internationalisation all require
flexible and decentral decision making, which is the market. Meanwhile
sustainability of sound policies, promoting supporting and correcting the
underlying arrangements require a broad social consensus. The latter may
emerge only from the democratic process of articulation and dovetailing
conflicting interests. Stable and high level provision of the side conditions to
these, including the security the adequate level of and fair availability in human
capital accumulation, as well as public goods and regulation concerns require
strong, but democratically accountable governments. These will probably be
slim, rather than cheap, forms of administration, especially if corruption is to be
rooted out.
The imperative of decentral decision making and plurality of options applies a
fortiori for large, regionally diverse countries where a uniform straightjacket
proves to be debilitating any time anyhow. From this perspective the
spontaneous emergence of true federalism in Russia is a most encouraging sign,
even if it is institutionalization covers primarily the legislative and executive
branches. Completing this fact of life with open, transparent and regulated
fiscal federalism would lay the ground work for sustaining democratization in
Russia for a long time.
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